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Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP84B00506R000100120001-1

Registry
Committee 16(1)

IC 75-1486
30 May 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
SALT Support Staff

SUBJECT:

NSCIC Working Group Reactions to Your Briefing

1. General Wilson wishes me to express his appreciation for the fine briefing on "Monitoring a SALT Agreement" you presented to the NSCIC Working Group on 20 May. In addition, you might like to have a reminder of the principal questions tossed up by the other Working Group members. Some of these questions probably have been raised before, and some may be raised again--e.g., in high-level briefings to PFIAB.

2. Ambassador Ellsworth was your most persistent challenger. In setting forth the proposition that "we don't think the Soviets have the incentive to cheat" on a SAL agreement, you had to beat back Ellsworth's point that there was "no intelligence" bearing on this proposition. You argued that there was at least good logic bearing on it. However, when you reached the part of your briefing touching on the [REDACTED] Ellsworth asserted that this Soviet development "defies the logic" of the other proposition.

3. He also tried to pin you down on the estimate that if the Soviets decided to deploy mobile ICBMs the US intelligence community could confirm this in "about a year." One of Ambassador Ellsworth's concerns is that the community make such judgments more explicit. Indeed the Working Group is prodding the IC Staff to develop a paper on this general subject.

4. Ambassador Ellsworth was joined by other WG members, chiefly RADM Hilton and Foster Collins, in inquiring about the community's capability to verify which Soviet deployed systems were MIRVed and which were not. Your answers touched on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] both the Soviet systems and our Minuteman systems. That seemed to satisfy the questioners; perhaps a graphic showing [REDACTED] (US and Soviet) similar to your other comparative graphics--which were excellent--might be useful for the future.

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5. RADM Hilton showed great concern about whether the Soviets will MIRV their SLBMs. When you concluded your response to him that "we believe" the Soviets will, I half expected Ambassador Ellsworth to add that in this case our belief was based on something more than just logic.

6. Again, thanks for your cooperation and a fine briefing.

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Executive Secretary
NSCIC Working Group

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